Apparently, we hadn't really been supporting them for quite some time. They'd get airstrikes if they needed them but nothing to resupply the ground forces. Supposedly, the bulk of the aircraft in the Afghan Air Force couldn't fly due to a lack of spare parts that happened after we pulled all of our military contractors out of the area.
Al Jazeera has an editorial piece about it: First, there was widespread corruption in Afghanistan’s defence and interior ministries where funds, ammunition and food deliveries were stolen before reaching the soldiers on the ground. The ammunition and other equipment were sold on the black market, eventually ending up in the Taliban’s hands. Furthermore, some commanders embezzled money by submitting fund requests for the salaries of “ghost soldiers” – i.e. soldiers who had not actually signed up for the military. As this was happening, ANDSF personnel were kept unpaid and retained on duty without permission to leave and see their families for months. Unsurprisingly, the ANDSF had one of the highest desertion and casualty rates in the world. According to one estimate, the ANDSF’s per month attrition rate was 5,000 while the recruitment rate was 300 to 500. Second, the embezzlement and corruption undermined morale within the ranks of the army. The integrity of senior leadership is pivotal in military affairs to win the troops’ respect and loyalty. For unpaid soldiers, the lavish lifestyles of their commanders were often too much to swallow. Hence, instead of fighting and dying, they preferred to save their lives by surrendering to the Taliban under its amnesty offers. Third, there was also no ideological cohesion within the army or a sense of national duty and belonging. In fact, there was significant mistrust towards the country’s political leadership. No Afghan soldier was ready to fight and die to defend President Ashraf Ghani or the government. Conspiracy theories about a secret deal between the Afghan government and the Taliban were rife among Afghan troops. This environment of doubt and suspicion further undermined Afghan soldiers’ resolve to resist the advance of the ideologically cohesive Taliban, whose fighters were driven by a desire to establish an Islamic emirate and drive out foreign troops they saw as occupiers. Fourth, continuous political interference and reshuffling of office holders as high as interior and defence ministers, governors and police chiefs also affected the ANDSF’s battlefield performance. An army needs unity of command and leadership continuity to function properly and fight effectively on the battlefield. The military chief of staff is the centre of gravity of his organisation and if he is changed consistently, it adversely affects the organisation. President Ghani regularly changed his military leaders amid the US withdrawal and the Taliban’s offensive across Afghanistan. For instance, Ghani replaced the Afghan army chief Lieutenant General Wali Mohammad Ahmadzai, who was appointed in June, with the Afghan National Army’s special operations command, Major General Haibatullah Alizai. Similarly, he replaced his interior ministers twice and reshuffled his defence minister and six core commanders in recent months. Fifth, the Taliban’s smart military strategy of taking control of major border crossings, main highways and besieging the big cities crippled Kabul’s ability to send reinforcements and supplies. Many army units were cut off from the rest of the country and thus were forced to either flee across the border neighbouring countries or to dissolve. Finally, despite receiving years of training and billions of dollars worth of equipment, the ANDSF never developed the capacity to stand on its own. In fact, it was entirely dependent on the US and NATO troops to protect urban areas. Once these forces began to withdraw, there was no barrier to stop the advance of the Taliban and the weaknesses and incompetence that was covered up by foreign military presence quickly came to the fore. As the collapse of the ANDSF became apparent, the Afghan government scrambled to put together a new force composed of various militias. Three influential warlords – Atta Muhammad Noor of Jamiat-e-Islami, Abdul Rashid Dostum of Hezb-e-Junbish and Haji Muhammad Muhaqiq of Hezbe-e Wahdat Islami Mardom-e Afghanistan – met to forge a joint front against the Taliban and coordinate their struggle with the ANDSF. However, the fall of Mazar-i-Sharif to the Taliban forced them to flee the country. The collapse of the ANDSF even before the US withdrawal was completed and the way the gains of the so-called “war on terror” have been reversed will reverberate for years to come. The thousands of fighters freed by the Taliban from Bagram Airbase, including those from al-Qaeda and other groups, will pose a major security challenge in the region and beyond. https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2021/8/17/why-did-the-afghan-army-disintegrate-so-quickly
Right, so presumably then you're just as guilty for drone attacks on weddings and bombings of hospitals as those who directly ordered and carried them out?
There can be elements of both of those things in play, and others. The world is complicated. To paint with a broad brush, my understanding is that people in Afghan "countryside" (not the major cities) are very poor, hated the occupation because of some of the things you mentioned and are more likely to give some level of support to the Taliban on the grounds that they maintain some form of "law and order". People in the major cities are somewhat more prosperous and liberal, are more openly hostile of and fearful of the Taliban and are being or at risk of being "subjugated".
I have said that I voted for George W. Bush in 2000. I did not vote for him in 2004 because I had enough blood on my hands. Voters are responsible for the actions of those whom they elect. That's why breeches of public trust are so heinous. Haven't you argued, for years, that stock/share/stakeholders should be at least partially responsible for the bad actions of corporations?
Those are literally the owners of corporations, so yeah. But assigning responsibility is still a subtle thing. While you do inarguably share some of the responsibility for what people you vote for do, it's not total. (It can be argued that someone comfortably sitting in a western country, merely voting either for or against someone is still acquiescing to whatever they do, particularly since the Democrats have their hands dirty too.) But claiming that someone who out of a combination of fear, poverty and distrust of alternatives doesn't actively oppose an armed insurgent group is just as responsible for the actions of that insurgent group as the insurgents themselves is morally simplistic.
Correct me if I'm wrong, but aren't you someone who both things abortion is murder and uphold the rule of law in a nation that allows it?
When you buy a stock you assume a tiny position of power which you can exercise safely. You can buy another, or sell, depending on your approval of the company. No one is going to rape your daughter, burn down your house or behead your sons as a consequence. When you are invaded by a bloodthirsty mob intent on ensuring your freedom and autonomy are taken away you have no such luxury. You are having your power stripped from you and resisting carries the most severe consequences. Acquiescing when you have nothing but token gestures available is what most people will do.
For those who believe the Afghans are victims of the Taliban who are enforcing an unpopular system at gunpoint... https://wentworthreport.com/2021/08...n-sharia-is-democratic-will-of-99-of-afghans/
1. Go fuck yourself. It's shameful how hard you're trying to justify this betrayal. 2. There were multiple elections after the Taliban were thrown out of power. If the Afghan people truly wanted the Taliban back and sharia law as the only law, they could have easily elected candidates that promised those exact things. Afghanistan is right next to Iran and Pakistan, both of which have had elections for decades. Voting isn't some completely alien concept to the Afghan people. If the Taliban were truly that popular, they wouldn't have needed to wait for America to leave before taking over at gunpoint.
There's sharia and then there's sharia. Not every muslim is an extremist fuckhead the way the Taliban are.
Correct. The Taliban subscribe to a radical interpretation of Sharia which is way off the spectrum from the mainstream. Since the link doesn't mention that, one has to assume that it is aiming deliberately to mislead.
You know, I'm getting a little (actually a lot) tired of being accused of moral relativism and trying to justify this fiasco. I'm pointing out that it was never going to end any other way. You want to argue that the withdrawal is a shit show, I'm with you. If you want to argue that it could have ended differently fine. But I'm just the messenger. There's actually a special inspectorn general for Afghanistan who's been saying things no one in Washington or the media wanted to hear. The U.S. government has now spent 20 years and $145 billion trying to rebuild Afghanistan, its security forces, civilian government institutions, economy, and civil society. The Department of Defense (DOD) has also spent $837 billion on warfighting, during which 2,443 American troops and 1,144 allied troops have been killed and 20,666 U.S. troops injured. Afghans, meanwhile, have faced an even greater toll. At least 66,000 Afghan troops have been killed. More than 48,000 Afghan civilians have been killed, and at least 75,000 have been injured since 2001—both likely significant underestimations. The extraordinary costs were meant to serve a purpose—though the definition of that purpose evolved over time. At various points, the U.S. government hoped to eliminate al-Qaeda, decimate the Taliban movement that hosted it, deny all terrorist groups a safe haven in Afghanistan, build Afghan security forces so they could deny terrorists a safe haven in the future, and help the civilian government become legitimate and capable enough to win the trust of Afghans. Each goal, once accomplished, was thought to move the U.S. government one step closer to being able to depart. While there have been several areas of improvement—most notably in the areas of health care, maternal health, and education—progress has been elusive and the prospects for sustaining the progress that was made are dubious. The U.S. government has been often overwhelmed by the magnitude of rebuilding a country that, at the time of the U.S. invasion, had already seen two decades of Soviet occupation, civil war, and Taliban brutality. Since its founding in 2008, SIGAR has tried to make the U.S. government’s reconstruction of Afghanistan more likely to succeed. Our investigations held criminals accountable for defrauding the U.S. government; our audits and special projects reports identified weaknesses in programs before it was too late to improve them; our quarterly reports provided near real-time analysis of reconstruction problems as they unfolded; and our lessons learned reports identified challenges that threaten the viability of the entire American enterprise of rebuilding Afghanistan, and any similar efforts that may come after it. SIGAR has issued 427 audits, 191 special project reports, 52 quarterly reports, and 10 comprehensive lessons learned reports. Meanwhile, SIGAR’s criminal investigations have resulted in 160 convictions. This oversight work has cumulatively resulted in $3.84 billion in savings for the U.S. taxpayer. After conducting more than 760 interviews and reviewing thousands of government documents, our lessons learned analysis has revealed a troubled reconstruction effort that has yielded some success but has also been marked by too many failures. Using this body of work, as well as the work of other oversight organizations, SIGAR has identified seven key lessons that span the entire 20-year campaign and can be used in other conflict zones around the globe. 1. The U.S. government continuously struggled to develop and implement a coherent strategy for what it hoped to achieve. 2. The U.S. government consistently underestimated the amount of time required to rebuild Afghanistan and created unrealistic timelines and expectations that prioritized spending quickly. These choices increased corruption and reduced the effectiveness of programs. 3. Many of the institutions and infrastructure projects the United States built were not sustainable. 4. Counterproductive civilian and military personnel policies and practices thwarted the effort. 5. Persistent insecurity severely undermined reconstruction efforts. 6. The U.S. government did not understand the Afghan context and therefore failed to tailor its efforts accordingly. 7. U.S. government agencies rarely conducted sufficient monitoring and evaluation to understand the impact of their efforts.
Okay, then stop doing those things. Stop saying "we lost the moral capacity to help people because we elected Trump," or describing holding back the Taliban as "imposing ourselves" on a country, or posting surveys and claiming that's proof the Afghan people don't mind the Taliban putting themselves back in power at gunpoint after failing to do so after multiple elections, or claiming there was no other way things could have ended when that's not the case. There you go again. No you're not. You're trying to ease your own conscience and assuage the guilt of your more honourable countrymen, and I'm not here for it.
Read the fucking report and tell me it was going to end any other way. Oh and don't forget about the long war the USSR fought trying to impose themselves on Afghanistan. How'd that work out for them? Afghanistant has been at war and dealing with superpowers trying to turn it into a client/puppet state for more than 40 years. At some point you have to wonder if it's going to happen at all.
Staying for at least 30 more years like Lanzman and I suggested would have given America a lot of time to fix it's earlier mistakes. You keep saying that. "Impose themselves." This wasn't about "imposing" on anyone. This was about keeping the Taliban out of power because they're literal barbarians that are only a couple notches less horrible than Nazis, and humanity as a whole is better off keeping them from taking power anywhere on Earth. You're still reciting dogma from an outdated leftist anti-war textbook, dude. This wasn't about colonizing. This wasn't about imperialism. This wasn't about "imposing ourselves" on anyone. It was about holding back evil. Period.
